On the Index of Environmental Awareness by Ono, Tetsuo & Maeda, Yasuo
  　       
                
   September 2000
    この研究は「大学院経済学研究科・経済学部記念事業」
         基金より援助を受けた、記して感謝する。
    Graduate School of Economics and
    Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP)
    Osaka University, Toyonaka, Osaka 560-0043, Japan
On the Index of Environmental Awareness
Tetsuo Ono
Yasuo Maeda
Discussion Paper 00-16
September 2000
On the Index of Environmental Awareness∗†
Tetsuo ONO
College of Economics, Osaka Prefecture University
Yasuo MAEDA
Faculty of Economics, Osaka University
Abstract
We develop a two-country model where each country contributes non-cooperatively to the global en-
vironment by improving its local environment. We introduce an index of environmental awareness,
which measures how much a country is aware of the global environment. Then, we show that the index
plays a key role in evaluating the effects of income growth and international transfers on the global
environment.
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1 Introduction
Disagreement over the control of the global environment was observed in the 1992 Rio de Janeiro
and 1997 Kyoto Congresses. This conflict seems to imply that developed and developing countries
differ about preference for the environment. To capture such difference, we develop an index of
environmental awareness, which measures how much a country is aware of the global environment.
Then, we show that several comparative statics results depend crucially on the environmental
awareness of each country.
For the purpose of our analysis, we develop a two-country model with three features. First,
the global environment is an international public good shared by the two countries.1 Our
model is an extension of models of private provision of public goods.2 Second, each country
obtains utility from its local environment as well as the global environment which depends on
the quality of the local environment in each country. Third, each country’s consumption has
a negative effect on the local environment but it is counterbalanced by the positive effect of
maintenance investment. These two effects spread over the global environment.
In this framework, we introduce an index of environmental awareness. This index is an
extended version of Andreoni (1989, 1990) that evaluates the degree of impure altruism. By
applying his analysis, we develop an index which measures how much a country is aware of the
global environment.
The index we develop in this paper plays a key role in the comparative statics analysis. First,
income growth of a country results in improvement in the global environment, and the effect
becomes larger as the country is more aware of the global environment. Second, the effects of
1 See, Buchholz and Konrad (1994), Niho (1996), Stranlund (1996), Murdoch and Sandler (1997), Ono (1998),
and Caplan et al. (1999).
2 See, for example, Warr (1983), Bergstrom et al. (1986), Buchholz and Konrad (1995), and Ihori (1996).
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both conditional and unconditional aid programs on the global environment depend only on the
relative degrees of environmental awareness between two countries. If the donor is more aware
of the global environment than the recipient, then both types of aid programs result in the
deterioration of the global environment.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 develops the model and shows the exis-
tence and uniqueness of equilibrium. Section 3 introduces the index of environmental awareness
and shows its implication by considering the effects of income growth on the global environment.
Section 4 evaluates the effects of international transfers on the global environment by using the
index. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model and Equilibrium
We consider a model with two countries, i = 1, 2. We assume that each country is represented
by a benevolent government acting on behalf of its citizens.
Country i is endowed with wi units of private goods. It divides income into consumption ci
and maintenance investment in the local environment, mi. The budget equation of country i is:
ci +mi = wi. (1)
The local environment in country i, ei, is improved by country i’s maintenance investment
but is worsened by its consumption. We express this mechanism as the formula:
ei = −βici + γimi, (2)
where βi > 0 is a parameter which indicates the degree of consumption externality and γi > 0
is a parameter which shows the efficiency of maintenance investment.3
3 Examples of maintenance investment are forestry programs, sewerage systems, development of electric cars,
and so on. Examples of environmentally harmful activities are deforestation, water pollution, emissions from
diesel trucks, and so on.
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We assume that the quality of the global environment, E, is determined by:4
E =
2∑
i=1
ei. (3)
Country i obtains utility from consumption, the local environment, and the global environ-
ment. The utility of country i is ui(ci, ei, E) where ui : 3+ →  is continuous, increasing, strictly
quasi-concave, and twice continuously differentiable on 3++ with limx→0 uix = ∞ (x = ci, ei, or
E) where uix means the partial derivative with respect to x.
We assume simultaneous and non-cooperative Nash behavior. Country i maximizes its utility
subject to (1), (2), and (3) given the local environment of the other country ej(j = i). By
substituting (1), (2), and (3) into the utility function, the maximization problem is equivalent
to
max
{E}
ui(
1
βi + γi
(γiwi + ej)− 1
βi + γi
E,E − ej, E), (4)
where ej(j = i) is given.
Differentiating (4) with respect to E and setting it equal to zero, we can determine the
optimal level of E for country i : 5
E = f i(
1
βi + γi
(γiwi + ej), ej) (5)
where f i : 2+ → + is continuously differentiable on 2++. This is country i’s demand function for
the global environment. The first argument in f i comes from the global environment dimension
of the utility function, while the second argument comes from the local environment dimension
of the utility function.
4 We could consider that the quality of the global environment E is partially related to the local environment of
each country in a complicated way. For example, traffic noise and water pollution only affect the local environment.
On the other hand, air pollution can affect the global environment; and the total stock of greenhouse gases in the
atmosphere is actually composed of emissions of those gases by each country. To make the analysis tractable, we
express this complicated relationship between local and global environment in a simple manner expressed by (3).
5 We have mi > 0 from the boundary condition of the utility function.
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By subtracting ej from both sides of (5), we obtain a demand function of country i for its
local environment:
ei = f i(
1
βi + γi
(γiwi + ej), ej)− ej . (6)
We can regard (6) as a Nash reaction function; country i chooses ei given the other coun-
try’s choice, ej(j = i). By using this reaction function, we show the existence of a unique non-
cooperative Nash equilibrium. A non-cooperative Nash equilibrium is an allocation {c1, c2, m1, m2, e1, e2, E}
such that (a) e1and e2 satisfies (6) for i, j = 1, 2; i = j; (b) E = e1+e2; and (c) {ci, mi, ei} satisfies
(1) and (2) for i = 1, 2. We obtain the following result:
Proposition 2.1: There exists a unique and interior non-cooperative Nash equilibrium.
Proof. See appendix.
3 The Index of Environmental Awareness: Definition and
Implication
3.1 Definition
In this subsection, we introduce the index of environmental awareness which measures how
much a country is aware of the global environment. To establish the index, we first consider the
properties of the partial derivatives of f i, ∂f i/∂wi and ∂f i/∂ej which evaluate how changes in
income and other country’s choices regarding local environment affect country i’s demand for
global environment, respectively. We then develop the index by using these derivatives.
Consider first the income effect: ∂f i/∂wi = γif i1/(β
i + γi). If country i has no interest in
the global environment, it would spend any additional unit of endowment only on consumption:
∂f i/∂wi = 0. On the other hand, if country i is only concerned about the global environment, it
would spend all additional endowment on environmental maintenance: ∂f i/∂wi = γi. The value
of the derivative increases as country i becomes more aware of the global environment.
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Consider next ∂f i/∂ej = f i1/(β
i+ γi) + f i2. Suppose that the global environment is improved
by one unit because of an increase in ej by one unit. Then country i (i = j) would respond by
decreasing its maintenance investment and increasing its consumption, thereby decreasing ei. In
other words, the global environmental quality may increase less than one unit: ∂f i/∂ej ∈ (0, 1).
To show the above result, we first consider the case in which country i has no interest in the
global environment: ui = ui(ci, ei). In this case, the problem of country i is to maximize ui(ci, ei)
subject to ci +mi = wi and ei = −βici + γimi. Since ej does not affect the choice of country i,
we have ∂f i/∂ej = 1. Thus, we have ∂f i/∂ej < 1 in the case of ui(ci, ei, E).
To show that 0 < ∂f i/∂ej , we rewrite the utility maximization problem as:
max
{ci,ei}
ui(ci, ei, ei + ej)
s.t. (1 +
βi
γi
)ci +
1
γi
E = wi +
1
γi
ej ≡ wˆ.
The social wealth wˆ increases as ej increases. Since consumption, local environment, and global
environment are normal goods with respect to social wealth, we have 0 < ∂f i/∂ej .
Suppose that country i is more aware of the global environment. Then, it reacts greatly to
the improvement of the global environment made by country j (j = i) so that it would respond
by a larger decrease in its maintenance investment. On the other hand, if country i is less aware
of the global environment, then it reacts little to the improvement. Therefore, ∂f i/∂ej becomes
smaller as country i is more aware of the global environment.
Since a larger ∂f i/∂wi and a smaller ∂f i/∂ej imply greater awareness of the global environ-
ment for country i, it is natural to construct an index of environmental awareness by having
∂f i/∂wi in the numerator and ∂f i/∂ej in the denominator. Therefore, we define the index as
follows:
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Definition 3.1: Country i’s environmental awareness, αi (i = 1, 2), is indexed by
αi ≡ ∂f
i/∂wi
∂f i/∂ej
=
f i1
γi
βi+γi
f i1
1
βi+γi
+ f i2
. (7)
Country i is more aware of the global environment as αi becomes large.
The numerator of αi shows the increase in the demand for the global environment when
country i is faced with income growth. The greater value of the numerator implies that country
i is more aware of the global environment. The denominator shows an increase in the demand
for the global environment when the other country increases the quality of its local environment.
A lower value of the denominator implies that country i is more aware of the global environment.
Thus, a larger αi means that country i is more aware of the global environment.
3.2 The Effect of Income Growth on the Global Environment
In this subsection, we demonstrate how much environmental awareness is important in analyzing
the global environmental issues. In particular, we show that the effect of income growth on the
global environment depends on the index of environmental awareness.
Differentiating the Nash reaction function of country i with respect to ei, ej, and wi (i = j),
we have:
dei = (f i1
1
βi + γi
+ f i2 − 1)dej + f i1
γi
βi + γi
dwi (8)
Substituting dej = dE − dei and rearranging, we see that
dei =
f i1
1
βi+γi
+ f i2 − 1
f i1
1
βi+γi
+ f i2
dE + αidwi. (9)
Adding (9) for i = 1, j = 2 and (9) for i = 2, j = 1 and rearranging, we find that
dE = c(α1dw1 + α2dw2), (10)
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where
c ≡ [1 + ∑
i=1,2
1− (f i1 1βi+γi + f i2)
f i1
1
βi+γi
+ f i2
]−1 > 0.
We thus obtain the following result:
Proposition 3.1: Income growth of country i has a greater positive effect on the global envi-
ronment than that of country j (j = i) if and only if country i is more aware of the global
environment than country j.
The coefficient c in (10) is the same regardless of which country is faced with income growth.
Hence, (10) shows that whether the effect of country i’s income growth on the global environment
is greater than that of country j (j = i) depends on the relative degree of environmental awareness
between the two countries. As regard to the effects of income growth on the local environment,
we obtain the following results; income growth of country i has a positive effect on the local
environment of country i and a negative effect on the local environment of country j (j = i).6
To understand this result, we first consider a situation where country 1 experiences income
growth while country 2 does not. Country 1 can afford to invest more in its local environment
because of the income effect. This implies improvement in country 1’s local environment, and
thereby improvement in the global environment.7 However, an improvement of country 1’s local
environment leads to strategic interaction with country 2: country 2 chooses to lower the quality
of its local environment thereby decreasing the quality of the global environment. In sum, the
6 To show this result, we undertake comparative statics by using (8). Then, we obtain
∂ei/∂wi = αif i1
γi
βi + γi
/ |D| > 0,
∂ej/∂wi = αi(f i1
1
βi + γi
+ f i2)(f
j
1
1
βj + γj
+ f j2 − 1)/ |D| < 0,
where |D| = 1−Π2j=1(f j1 1βj+γj + f j2 − 1) > 0.
7 For example, if a country spends much resources to reduce domestic gas emissions, then the total amount of
emissions in the world would decrease.
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effect is evaluated by dE = cα1dw1. On the other hand, if country 2 is faced with income growth,
then it contributes to an improvement in the global environment while country 1 does not. The
total effect is evaluated by dE = cα2dw2. Which case of income growth has a greater effect on
the global environment depends on the relative degrees of environmental awareness between two
countries.
4 International Transfers
In this section, we evaluate the effects of international transfers, i.e., conditional and uncondi-
tional aid programs on the global environment by using the index of environmental awareness.
4.1 Unconditional Aid
In this subsection, we consider unconditional aid. Without loss of generality, we assume that
country 1 transfers a part of its income τ 1l ∈ (0, w1) to country 2 in a lump-sum fashion. Since
a marginal increase in lump-sum transfer implies dw1 = −dτ1l and dw2 = dτ 1l in (10), we have
dE˜ = c˜(α2 − α1)dτ 1l
where
c˜ ≡ [1 + ∑
i=1,2
1− (f i1 1βi+γi + f i2)
f i1
1
βi+γi
+ f i2
]−1 > 0.
We thus obtain the following result:
Proposition 4.1: Unconditional aid has a positive effect on the global environment if and only
if the recipient is more aware of the global environment relative to the donor.
To interpret the results, suppose first that neither country obtains utility from the local
environment. If country 1 implements a lump-sum transfer to country 2, then country 1 reduces
its maintenance investment by the same amount, while country 2 invests all the transfer in
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its local environment. Thus, the global environment is unchanged as long as γ1 = γ2 (Warr
(1983)). Suppose next that both countries obtain utility from their local environment. Such
countries prefer a higher quality of the local environment. Hence, country 1 is unwilling to reduce
its maintenance investment to offset a reduction in income, and country 2 is also unwilling to
increase its maintenance investment following the increase in income. The relative degree to
which both countries are unwilling to make these substitutions is reflected in the difference
between the two indexes of environmental awareness, α2 − α1.
Official Development Assistance (ODA) to developing countries is often criticized in view of
environmental preservation. This is because developing countries tend to spend most transfers on
investment in infrastructure like buildings and dams, which are often harmful to the environment.
However, our result shows that unconditional aid is harmful to the global environment, not
because recipient (developing) countries do not use transfers for environmental maintenance, but
because they are less aware of the global environment relative to donor countries. In order to
make unconditional aid beneficial to the global environment, donor countries need to enlighten
people in developing countries as to how much the preservation of the global environment is
important.
4.2 Conditional Aid
In this subsection, we consider conditional aid: a donor requires that a recipient spends the
transfer only on environmental maintenance. Without loss of generality, we assume that country
1 gives tied aid τ 2m > 0 to country 2.
The budget equation of country 1 is c1+m1 = w1−τ 2m and the local environment in country 1
is e1 = −β1c1+γ1m1. For country 2, the budget equation is c2+(m2+τ 2m) = w2+τ 2m and the local
environment is e2 = −β2c2 + γ2(m2 + τ 2m). Substituting these constraints into the corresponding
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utility functions and solving the maximization problems, we can obtain Nash reaction functions
for countries 1 and 2. The allocation under conditional aid, {eˆ1, eˆ2}, is characterized by the
following Nash reaction functions:
eˆ1 = f 1(
1
β1 + γ1
(γ1(w1 − τ 2m) + eˆ2), eˆ2)− eˆ2, (11)
eˆ2 = f 2(
1
β2 + γ2
(γ2(w2 + τ 2m) + eˆ
1), eˆ1)− eˆ1. (12)
By differentiating (11) - (12) with respect to eˆ1, eˆ2, τ 2m and rearranging, we obtain:
dEˆ = cˆ(α2 − α1)dτ 2m
where
cˆ ≡ [1 + ∑
i=1,2
1− (f i1 1βi+γi + f i2)
f i1
1
βi+γi
+ f i2
]−1 > 0.
We obtain the following result:
Proposition 4.2: Conditional aid has a positive effect on the global environment if and only
if the recipient is more aware of the global environment relative to the donor.
Many industrialized countries often implement conditional aid to developing countries. The
aim of conditional aid is to make developing countries invest in the environment. Our result,
however, indicates that conditional aid has the same implication for the global environment as
unconditional aid. Whether conditional aid is beneficial to the global environment depends on
the relative degrees of environmental awareness between the two countries.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce an index of environmental awareness, which measures how much a
country is aware of the global environment relative to its local environment. Then, we show
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that environmental awareness plays a key role in evaluating the effects of income growth and
international transfers on the global environment.
There have been many studies which analyze the effects of income growth and international
transfers on the global environment in two- or many-country non-cooperative Nash equilibrium
models. However, they have ignored the role of environmental awareness in evaluating the
effects. Contrary to previous studies, we show that the effects of income growth and international
transfers on the global environment depend critically on environmental awareness.
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Appendix
We first show the existence of a Nash equilibrium. From (1) and (2), we have mi =
1
βi+γi
(βiwi + ei). By substituting (6) into the above equation and eliminating ei, we obtain
mi =
1
βi + γi
{βiwi − ej + f i}. (13)
Let W = {m in 2 : 0 ≤ mi ≤ wi for i = 1, 2}. This is a compact and convex set. The
function (13) is a continuous function from the set W to itself. Hence, by Brouwer’s Fixed Point
Theorem, there exists a fixed point, which is a Nash equilibrium vector m.
We next show the uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium. Suppose that E∗ and E∗∗ are two
different equilibria of global environmental quality. We assume, without loss of generality, E∗ >
E∗∗. Since E = e1 + e2 and ei = −βici + γimi, i = 1, 2, in equilibrium at E∗, at least for one
country i, ei∗ > ei∗∗ holds. This implies that country i invests more in the environment than
in the equilibrium at E∗∗, i.e., mi∗ > mi∗∗. Hence, from the budget constraint ci + mi = wi,
ci∗ < ci∗∗ holds. However, from the normality assumption, the first-order condition of utility
maximization problem uici = (β
i + γi)(uiei + u
i
E) is rewritten as c
i = φi(ei, E) where ∂φi/∂ei > 0
and ∂φi/∂E > 0. Then, ci∗ < ci∗∗ and ei∗ > ei∗∗ implies E∗ < E∗∗ which is a contradiction.
Therefore, the equilibrium of the global environmental quality is unique.
By combining (1) and (2), the reduced form of constraints in equilibrium is
ci +
1
βi + γi
ei =
γiwi
βi + γi
. (14)
Substituting ci = φi(ei, E) into the above, we have
φi(ei, E) +
1
βi + γi
ei =
γiwi
βi + γi
. (15)
Given E, the left-hand side of (15) is strictly increasing in ei so that (15) uniquely determines ei,
and also (14) uniquely determines ci. Finally, mi is uniquely determined by the budget constraint.
The solution is interior (mi > 0) from the boundary condition of the utility function.
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